

# RUTGERS JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION

## -NUREMBURG PROJECT-

### COMMENTS ON:

***“ANALYSIS OF THE PERSONALITY OF ADOLPH HITLER:  
WITH PREDICTIONS OF HIS FUTURE BEHAVIOR AND SUGGESTIONS FOR DEALING WITH  
HIM NOW AND AFTER GERMANY’S SURRENDER”  
WRITTEN BY HENRY A. MURRAY, M.D.,***

***AND ON AN ADDITIONAL CHAPTER  
“HITLER THE MAN—NOTES FOR A CASE HISTORY”  
WRITTEN BY W.H.D. VERNON (DR. MURRAY’S STUDENT)***

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Background.....	121
II.	Military Service .....	122
III.	Analytic Tools and Methods.....	123
IV.	The Holocaust .....	124
V.	Political Success.....	125
VI.	Hitler’s Health.....	126
	A. Medical End Stage.....	127
	B. Process of Decline.....	128
	C. Memory Unaffected.....	133
	D. Neurological Manifestations.....	133
	E. Summary of Medical Decline .....	135
VII.	Diagnoses.....	135
	A. Methamphetamine Toxicity.....	136
	B. Parkinson’s Disease .....	137
VIII.	Effects of Drug Toxicity .....	138
	A. War with the United States .....	138
	B. The Holocaust .....	140
	C. Stalingrad.....	141
IX.	Conclusion .....	142

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## I. BACKGROUND

As he prepared his 1943 memorandum for the United States Office of Strategic Services, Dr. Henry A. Murray recognized he was severely handicapped by deficits in both amount and reliability of the information available to him.<sup>1</sup> He was charged with providing an analysis of Adolf Hitler's personality and predicting his behavior.<sup>2</sup> However, the United States government knew little about Adolf Hitler.<sup>3</sup> He had leapt into the world's spotlight from profound obscurity, leaving behind a personal history that was murky at best, and so, leaving governments and news organizations frantically scrambling to assemble dossiers.<sup>4</sup> Filling in blank spaces entailed using some highly questionable sources that, despite ongoing corrections over the intervening decades, cloud the history of Adolf Hitler to this day.

Among those sources was a scattering of Germans who had fled Hitler's Germany seeking refuge in other nations. Some of them sold stories about Hitler and the eager buyers were often duped. Some such accounts were fictional, many were grossly embellished, and others were frankly biased. For example, one prominent "authority," indeed the primary source apart from Hitler himself (in *Mein Kampf*) available to Dr. Murray about Hitler's Vienna years (1906-1913), was Reinhold Hanisch.<sup>5</sup> Hanisch and Hitler, who lived in the same men's hostel, formed a loose business partnership.<sup>6</sup> Hitler painted postcards of Vienna scenes that Hanisch peddled to tourists.<sup>7</sup> The proceeds were to be divided evenly.<sup>8</sup> Hitler, convinced that Hanisch was cheating him, filed a criminal

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<sup>1</sup> HENRY A. MURRAY, ANALYSIS OF THE PERSONALITY OF ADOLPH HITLER: WITH PREDICTIONS OF HIS FUTURE BEHAVIOR AND SUGGESTIONS FOR DEALING WITH HIM NOW AND AFTER GERMANY'S SURRENDER 2 (1943), available at [http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/donovan/pdf/Batch\\_15/Vol\\_XC.pdf](http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/donovan/pdf/Batch_15/Vol_XC.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Cornell Law Library, *Introduction* to ANALYSIS OF THE PERSONALITY OF ADOLPH HITLER, (last visited Dec. 8, 2010), <http://library.lawschool.cornell.edu/WhatWeHave/SpecialCollections/Donovan/Hitler/index.cfm>.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

<sup>4</sup> See generally MURRAY, *supra* note 1. A trivial, but I think telling example of this problem is a spelling lapse: Dr. Murray uses the conventional "Adolph" rather than "Adolf," Hitler's baptismal spelling.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 122.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at 58-59.

<sup>8</sup> LEONARD L. HESTON & RENATE HESTON, THE MEDICAL CASEBOOK OF ADOLF HITLER: HIS ILLNESSES, DOCTORS, AND DRUGS 67 (Cooper Square Press 2000) (1979).

complaint, and Hanisch received a jail sentence.<sup>9</sup> After Hitler ascended to power, Hanisch turned up in Paris and began selling his story.<sup>10</sup> There were several versions, but none putting Hitler in a favorable light.<sup>11</sup> Though Dr. Murray must be credited with a brave effort, such faulty data left him no chance at meaningful analysis of Hitler's personality or predicting his actions.

Since 1945, a massive volume of Hitler data has accumulated which attains reasonable reliability largely through its redundancy. This material corrects earlier accounts and adds significant details, but still fails to paint a satisfying portrait of Hitler. The fact that his cognitive abilities were at genius level must be stipulated. The force of his presence is well documented. But which of his specific abilities exceeded human norms and which were within them? What specific motivations were operative at specific junctures in his life? What gratified, what repelled him? What were his personal vulnerabilities? Despite innumerable investigations and speculative essays, there are few satisfactory answers to the many such questions still outstanding. And, of course, inability to adequately describe Hitler's personality, makes discovering the genesis of it quite impossible.

There is sufficient evidence to establish Hitler experienced an adolescent rebellion against authority: overt conflict with his father and his teachers, and passive contempt for the bureaucratic establishments underlying civic organization.<sup>12</sup> Hitler's rebellion was relatively intense and certainly affected his outlook and behavior through his feckless, or at best aimless, Vienna years.

## II. MILITARY SERVICE

Despite this adolescent revulsion, maturation released Hitler from that demon's hold on his motives and behavior. This is best evidenced by his record of military service (age 25-29).<sup>13</sup> Hitler went through four years of trench warfare; he was never disciplined,

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<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 68.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*

<sup>11</sup> *See id.* (discounting the myths created during this period).

<sup>12</sup> *See id.* at 66-67.

<sup>13</sup> *See* WERNER MASER, *HITLER: LEGEND, MYTH & REALITY* 88 (Peter Ross and Betty Ross trans., Harper & Row 1973) (1971).

twice wounded, and awarded an Iron Cross, Germany's premier military medal, and a distinction rarely awarded to enlisted men.<sup>14</sup> How far he had traveled from his Vienna years is demonstrated by the recommendation of his company commander that led to his medal.<sup>15</sup> Gefreiter (Lance Corporal) stated Hitler's courage in both trench and open warfare was exemplary and he always volunteered for tasks in the most dangerous situations.<sup>16</sup> Another military official said Hitler demonstrated profound love for his country, exceptional courage, and was regarded by his peers as an outstanding soldier and loyal comrade.<sup>17</sup> After the war, several members of his military unit, including his captain and first sergeant, joined Hitler's Nazi party.<sup>18</sup>

Hitler's accomplishments as a soldier diminish the likelihood of major psychological disturbance through his early adult life. Military service, especially arduous and lengthy service, provides one of the most sensitive and reliable litmus tests available for detecting structural personality defects.<sup>19</sup> Hitler unquestionably passed the test.<sup>20</sup> This negates the many analyses of his personality which projected into his future deficits that may have marked his Vienna years.<sup>21</sup> His adult personality was extremely unusual,<sup>22</sup> but there is no evidence that any specific ghost from his past significantly encumbered its adult expression.<sup>23</sup>

### III. ANALYTIC TOOLS AND METHODS

Dr. Murray attempted to explain Hitler's behavior and predict his future actions using the tools available a half-century ago.<sup>24</sup> Those psychoanalytic theories have been

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<sup>14</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 69.

<sup>15</sup> See MASER, *supra* note 13, at 88.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 87-88.

<sup>18</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 69.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.*

<sup>20</sup> *Id.*

<sup>21</sup> *Id.* at 70.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.* at 71.

<sup>23</sup> *Id.*

<sup>24</sup> See MURRAY, *supra* note 1, at 2.

largely discarded because they proved untestable and, in clinical practice, too often led to faulty assessments and conclusions.<sup>25</sup>

Today's tools are not much sharper, but overall, their limitations are better understood and respected. In light of those limitations, it must be acknowledged that despite the benefits of a huge database concerning Hitler and his milieu, and the hindsight of knowing what actually happened rather than relying on predictions, we cannot significantly improve on Dr. Murray's understanding of the critical problems that Hitler presents to history.

#### IV. THE HOLOCAUST

Perhaps the most prominent deficiency is accounting for the Holocaust. Although there is no paper trail linking Hitler directly to the systematic murder of Jews, gypsies and Soviet prisoners, he unquestionably participated in its origination and execution. No school or method, then or now, has a satisfactory explanation for the motivations that led Hitler to seek and attain dictatorial power, and then put that power to diabolical use establishing and maintaining the death camps.

Writing in 1943, Dr. Murray did not know about the camps. Nevertheless, he did try to account for Hitler's virulent anti-Semitism.<sup>26</sup> His formulations were the usual ones—hypothesized Jewish ancestors, Jews infiltrating and defiling “purer” races, cynical use of Jews as scapegoats—and while these can be readily discounted, explanations subsequently advanced are equally defective.<sup>27</sup> History is left with a Hitler

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<sup>25</sup> See generally *id.* Passages such as these are typical in Murray's exposition: “[A]s a boy, Hitler was severely shocked . . . by witnessing sexual intercourse between his parents, and his reaction to this trauma was to swear revenge, to dream of himself as reestablishing the lost glory of his mother by overcoming and humiliating his father.” *Id.* at 9. There is no evidence supporting this formulation which seems bizarre today, though it was standard fare at the time. At that, it would seem contradicted by this:

[T]he evidence is in favor of Hitler's having experienced the common Oedipus Complex . . . but that in his case this pattern was repressed and submerged by another pattern: profound admiration, envy and emulation of his father's masculine power and a contempt of his mother's feminine submissiveness and weakness . . . [H]is father was hated and respected; his mother loved and depreciated. Hitler's conspicuous actions have all been in imitation of his father, not his mother.

*Id.* at 10.

<sup>26</sup> *Id.* at 207-09.

<sup>27</sup> *Id.*

who was unremarkable in his subscription to the anti-Semitism prevalent in the Europe of his day.<sup>28</sup> But mass murder does not follow from such everyday prejudice. Hitler's additional motivation to perpetrate the Holocaust remains unknown.

## V. POLITICAL SUCCESS

Dr. Murray ascribed Hitler's political ascent to his oratorical gifts.<sup>29</sup> These extraordinary gifts were essential to his success.<sup>30</sup> Germans have repeatedly noted that Hitler had innate *Fingerspitzengefühl*, a fingertip feel for human relationships, enabling him to give voice to the innermost thoughts and feelings common to those in his audiences.<sup>31</sup> His oratory thus provoked deeply satisfying emotional release and a sense of community among the individuals in his audiences. This rapport generated profound and sustained allegiance to Hitler.<sup>32</sup>

An additional feature enabling his political ascent was Hitler's innovative political tactics.<sup>33</sup> Though they might not have been widely appreciated in 1943, one can see now how they were effective.<sup>34</sup> As Hitler learned he could move his audiences, he determined he would become a professional politician.<sup>35</sup> He had no career or family wealth, so he decided to make his living as a politician.<sup>36</sup> Hitler pioneered this career choice.<sup>37</sup> He had no significant historical precedents.<sup>38</sup> Then, as he reached out from Munich beer halls to the wider population, he sought votes by barnstorming around Germany in his private aircraft making the same basic speech several times a day.<sup>39</sup> He also mastered the use of radio.<sup>40</sup> Although he could not see his radio audiences, he honed his message so that its

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<sup>28</sup> See HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 71.

<sup>29</sup> MURRAY, *supra* note 1, at 219-20.

<sup>30</sup> See HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 70.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.*

<sup>32</sup> See MURRAY, *supra* note 1, at 219-20.

<sup>33</sup> See HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 146.

<sup>34</sup> See *id.* at 145-47 (describing Hitler's creative political tactics).

<sup>35</sup> MURRAY, *supra* note 1, at 133.

<sup>36</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 146 (describing how Hitler varied from the typical politician of his time).

<sup>37</sup> *Id.*

<sup>38</sup> See *id.* at 69, 146.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.* at 145.

<sup>40</sup> See *id.*

effectiveness was retained.<sup>41</sup> Importantly, we should note Hitler was arguably the first thoroughly modern politician.<sup>42</sup>

## VI. HITLER'S HEALTH

As he contemplated the war's end stages, Dr. Murray speculated Hitler's health might be deteriorating.<sup>43</sup> He had little evidence supporting that thesis, but we now know that he was correct.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, evidence unavailable to Dr. Murray suggests reasonable diagnoses and causal factors.<sup>45</sup> This is an important and relatively neglected aspect of the Hitler story.

The decline in Hitler's mental and physical health was stunning. In 1941 he was a vigorous man in his early 50s. True, for the previous ten years he had experienced intermittent abdominal distress most likely due to gallstones.<sup>46</sup> However, severe attacks of biliary colic were infrequent and his personal physician, the infamous Theo Morell, had finally stumbled into effective treatments for them when they did occur.<sup>47</sup> The symptoms were inconvenient but the underlying disease neither progressed nor significantly detracted from Hitler's robust good health. By 1945 however, he was a physical wreck. Descriptions of his medical end stage spotlight a sickened man whose impairments carry profound implications for students of the history that he so largely created.

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<sup>41</sup> *See id.* at 145-46.

<sup>42</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 145-46.

<sup>43</sup> MURRAY, *supra* note 1, at 81.

<sup>44</sup> *See* HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 21.

<sup>45</sup> *See id.* at 21-23.

<sup>46</sup> *See id.* at 105-08.

<sup>47</sup> *See id.* at 35-36, 104-08 (citing Theo Morell, Preliminary Interrogation Report (September 14, 1945) (on file with the Military Records Div. Nat'l Archives, Washington, D.C.)). Hitler had typical signs and symptoms: cramping right upper quadrant pain especially after fatty meals (this was the likely origin of his vegetarian diet), two episodes of transient jaundice (Sept. 27 & Oct. 2, 1944 definite, Nov., 1944 probable) with clay colored stool and dark brown urine accompanied by increased cramping pain, and one, possibly two, episodes of the same pain plus high fever. *Id.* Morell used intravenous papaverinum and morphine. *Id.*

### A. Medical End Stage

To his Soviet captors, General Helmuth Weilding described Hitler during one of his last morning conferences:

Hitler rose from his desk with difficulty, supporting himself with both hands on the desktop. From time to time he would unexpectedly display an interest in minor matters, that for some reason, he discussed in great detail. A human wreck was head of the German state. Hitler was a spent force.<sup>48</sup>

Dr. Ernst-Günther Schenck, an army physician called from field service to become the last active physician in Hitler's Berlin bunker, described Hitler in late April 1945:

I had never seen Hitler before. As soon as I did see him I finally became certain of what I had known in my heart for a long time. The war was lost. Hitler was a shell of a man no longer able to lead Germany. He walked—really shuffled, head bobbing up and down, only with the help of railings that had been installed along corridors. He stopped to rest every few meters. Stooped, trembling, his movements slow, he seemed near to death. His eyes were dull, his expression vacant. A pathetic thing, a man in his last retreat, waving papers that fluttered like leaves in his twitching hands. I knew that he would never leave the bunker. Even if a path were cleared for him he would not have had the strength to use it.<sup>49</sup>

General Manheim, recalled to duty in 1945 after five years of forced retirement, described the Hitler he found:

I was told by a staff officer that I must be prepared to find a man quite different from the one I had known [before 1939], either in the flesh or from photographs and newsreels, for he was now old and worn out. The reality exceeded by far what I had been led to expect. . . . The Hitler [I had known] was in no way comparable to the wreck of a man to whom I reported on 25 March 1945 and who wearily stretched out a nerveless, trembling hand toward me. . . . It was a ghastly physical image he presented. . . . [H]is body was bowed and he dragged his feet as he made his way slowly and laboriously through the bunker from his living room to the conference room. He had no sense of balance. If anyone happened to stop him during his walk . . . he was forced either to sit down on one of the seats placed along the walls for [that] purpose, or to catch hold of the

<sup>48</sup> DVD: Documents from KGB Secret Archives (Progress Publishing Co. 1995) (Moscow).

<sup>49</sup> Interview with E.G. Schenck (1975).



person he was speaking to [for support]. . . . Often saliva would dribble from the corners of his mouth . . . presenting a hideous and pitiful spectacle.<sup>50</sup>

During the last days, Hitler could no longer write legibly, and was using a rubber stamp to sign his name. In addition, the uniform of the fastidiously neat Hitler was stained with food that he could not manage to get to his mouth.<sup>51</sup> Traudl Junge, one of Hitler's secretaries, described him to me: "At the last, face puffy, hands shaking, hardly able to walk, needing help to sit down or to arise, he decided to take his life."<sup>52</sup>

## B. Process of Decline

This striking end stage picture followed a progressive decline that was first noticeable in late 1941 or early 1942.<sup>53</sup> The initial changes were in mental status.<sup>54</sup> These were soon followed by deficits in neurological functions.<sup>55</sup> There exist many descriptions of these intermediate steps.

At the Nuremberg Trial, when questioned about Hitler in mid 1942, Luftwaffe General Ehrhard Milch, a consistent attendee at Hitler's daily military conferences, described Hitler as "changed," stating, "[T]he abnormality was not such that one could say, 'this man is out of his senses,' or, 'this man is insane.'"<sup>56</sup> It did not usually reach that stage. His abnormalities were such that they might escape the public and even near associates.<sup>57</sup>

However, the changes in Hitler's mental processes that Milch noted became increasingly obvious to observers.<sup>58</sup> Early manifestations included increasing neglect of major strategic questions, and instead focusing on minute details; often the positions of

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<sup>50</sup> MASER, *supra* note 13, at 227 (citing PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM, HITLER ALS MILITÄRISCHER FÜHRER 134 (Frankfort 1962)).

<sup>51</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 52.

<sup>52</sup> Interview with Traudl Junge (1977).

<sup>53</sup> See HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 38.

<sup>54</sup> See, e.g., *id.* at 44 (discussing how Hitler's thinking became disorganized).

<sup>55</sup> See *id.* at 49.

<sup>56</sup> Trial of the Major War Criminals, International Military Tribunal, Vol. IX 92 (March 11, 1946) (1947).

<sup>57</sup> *Id.*

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g., HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 43.

single divisions or artillery batteries.<sup>59</sup> Field Marshal von Rundstedt described the effect: “Whenever formerly the general staff would present their plans there were intelligent counter questions [from Hitler]. Later, [in early 1944] Hitler would lose himself in details, would question why this or that pillbox had not been fortified.”<sup>60</sup>

As he was the supreme commander, Hitler's increasing obsession with detail had grave consequences for the command structure and its operational efficiency.<sup>61</sup> Every order had to have Hitler's approval. Von Rundstedt summarized bitterly that, “[t]he only troops I could move without permission were the sentries outside my door.”<sup>62</sup>

Albert Speer, Hitler's armaments minister and his closest associate from 1943 onward noted, “[w]hereas in the past he had known how to let others work for him, he now assumed more and more responsibility for details.”<sup>63</sup>

Hitler's thinking became rigid, leaving him less able to constructively accommodate new situations. This was a major change in Hitler, one that was profoundly detrimental to the German war effort. For example, General Walter Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Operations in early 1944, noted:

The more difficult the situation became, the more frequently would Hitler say that the enemy will soon be “at the end of his tether.” [By Hitler's orders, we sacrificed mobility in order to] remain[] rigidly bound to pieces of terrain [and equipment] . . . [Hitler thought that] we must stand where we were because this was the most effective form of defense; we must tie the enemy down because otherwise he would turn up somewhere else, even though the result was to tie ourselves down until it was too late. . . . [Decisions] were made only day by day; they came late and emerged as a result of interminable monologues.<sup>64</sup>

Albert Speer's description of Hitler's last three years is especially telling with respect to Hitler's diminished capacity.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> *Id.*

<sup>60</sup> *Id.* (quoting Interrogation of G. Von Runstedt, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (1945)).

<sup>61</sup> *Id.* at 43.

<sup>62</sup> *Id.* (quoting Interrogation of G. Von Runstedt, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (1945)).

<sup>63</sup> ALBERT SPEER, *INSIDE THE THIRD REICH* 293 (Clara Winston & Richard Winston trans., Macmillan Co. 1970) (1969).

<sup>64</sup> WALTER WARLIMONT, *INSIDE HITLER'S HEADQUARTERS: 1939-45*, 278 (R.H. Barry trans., Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1964) (1962).

<sup>65</sup> See generally RICHARD OVERY, *The Driving Force: Albert Speer, in INTERROGATIONS: THE NAZI ELITE IN ALLIED HANDS, 1945*, 215-58 (Penguin Books 2001) (1945).

Whereas before, constant variations and entirely new ways continually occurred to him, elegantly extricating him from what looked like blind alleys; whereas earlier, from the time of the occupation of Austria and up to the Russian pact, he constantly offered both his entourage and the world new surprises, he completely lacked this gift from 1942 onwards.<sup>66</sup>

Crisp decisions became rare. Warlimont quoted the army's War Diary from December 12, 1942,<sup>67</sup> which noted, "as before no decisions were taken; it looks as if the Führer is no longer capable of making them."<sup>68</sup> Commenting on Hitler in 1944, Warlimont, stated: "[U]rgent concrete questions and proposals under discussion would be drowned in [Hitler's] ceaseless repetitive torrent of words in which matters old and new, important and unimportant were jumbled up together . . . Hours and hours were spent every day in this fashion."<sup>69</sup>

Albert Speer, noted: "Occasionally Hitler still made decisions alertly and spontaneously, as he had in the past, and once in a long while he would even listen attentively to opposing arguments. But these times had become so unusual that we afterward made special note of them."<sup>70</sup> Further, Speer stated that Hitler's, "conversations became monologues, endless repetitions of the same ideas."<sup>71</sup> Hitler "had grown intellectually more sluggish and showed little inclination to develop new ideas. It was as if he were running along an unalterable track."<sup>72</sup>

Other changes included heightened irritability that frequently reached the level of morbid anger – angry outbursts that in intensity and duration observers regarded as grossly exaggerated given the events eliciting them.<sup>73</sup> An increasingly suspicious, sometimes overtly paranoid outlook accompanied this change.<sup>74</sup> In late 1943 and early 1944 he made telling changes in his routines. He began taking his meals alone instead of

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<sup>66</sup> *Id.* at 228.

<sup>67</sup> WARLIMONT, *supra* note 64, at 278.

<sup>68</sup> *Id.*

<sup>69</sup> *Id.* at 221.

<sup>70</sup> SPEER, *supra* note 63, at 295.

<sup>71</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 44 (quoting OTTO DIETRICH, HITLER 145 (Richard & Clara Winston trans., Henry Regney Co., 1955)).

<sup>72</sup> SPEER, *supra* note 63, at 293.

<sup>73</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 40.

<sup>74</sup> *Id.* at 45.

in the officer's mess where he had previously seemed to enjoy the camaraderie.<sup>75</sup> He began having teams of stenographers record verbatim the proceedings of his military meetings and he stopped shaking hands with the participants in those meetings.<sup>76</sup> The atmosphere around Hitler became infused with hostility and distrust.<sup>77</sup>

Subtler, though more important, were alterations in Hitler's mood.<sup>78</sup> Previously, Hitler's moods had exhibited a normal equilibrium: up or down, happy or depressed, in understandable proportions depending on favorable or unfavorable events.<sup>79</sup> After mid 1942, Hitler's mood became progressively disassociated from events.<sup>80</sup> While there were short episodes of depression, the prevailing change was in the direction of over-elation.<sup>81</sup> Hitler became chronically "high" or, hypomanic.<sup>82</sup>

This change was critically important although that may not at first be obvious. Mood colors life. When depressed, every facet of personal history, including all possessions, all human relationships, all that has happened and all that will ever happen, becomes darkly tinged to utterly black, depending on the depth of the depression.<sup>83</sup> Conversely, during personal highs everything good seems possible, problems dissolve, and the past, present and the future seem vividly important and cause for elation.<sup>84</sup> The environment is assessed and dealt with against those alternative backgrounds, often leading to grave errors in judgment.<sup>85</sup> Thus, depression causes overestimation of obstacles and inhibition of action, while an excessively high mood leads to minimizing or neglecting real hazards and problems as well as impulsive, ill-considered actions.<sup>86</sup>

Speer provides a graphic description of Hitler's over-elation:

Between the spring of 1942 and the summer of 1943 he sometimes spoke

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<sup>75</sup> *Id.* at 40.

<sup>76</sup> *Id.*

<sup>77</sup> *Id.*

<sup>78</sup> *Id.* at 45. Mood is defined as the prevailing emotional tone over a span of time—usually described with words such as “happy” or “sad.” *Id.* It is to be distinguished from *affect* which denotes moment to moment fluctuations.

<sup>79</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 45.

<sup>80</sup> *Id.*

<sup>81</sup> *Id.*

<sup>82</sup> *Id.*

<sup>83</sup> *Id.* at 46.

<sup>84</sup> *Id.*

<sup>85</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 46.

<sup>86</sup> *Id.*

despondently. But, then, a curious transformation seemed to take place in him. Even in desperate situations he displayed confidence in ultimate victory. From this later period I can scarcely recall any remarks on the disastrous course of affairs . . . . [T]he more inexorably events moved towards catastrophe, the more inflexible he became, the more rigidly convinced that everything he decided on was right.<sup>87</sup>

Heinz Linge, Hitler's valet, also described Hitler to me as usually highly optimistic, sometimes elated, despite realities that were increasingly grim; he seemed to become more impervious to disastrous news from the spring of 1943 onward.<sup>88</sup>

Consistent with his euphoric mood, Hitler's estimates of the likely course of future events came to exhibit little suggestion of analytic thought; he became grossly unrealistic and overly optimistic.<sup>89</sup> In his daily conferences, he often refused to address problems, asserting there were ways to overcome any obstacles and to think otherwise was idiocy.<sup>90</sup> Larger decisions were also based on overly optimistic expectations.<sup>91</sup> There are several telling examples of such unrealistic and optimistic expectations. First, Hitler rushed the first six Tiger tanks off the production lines and prematurely into battle in order to reverse the retreat in the Soviet Union.<sup>92</sup> Second, he believed the rocket weapons would defeat England.<sup>93</sup> Third, he was convinced Franklin D. Roosevelt's death, in April of 1945, would cause a split between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union which would lead to German victory.<sup>94</sup> Fourth, he thought the Stalingrad army could be supplied from the air.<sup>95</sup> And finally, Hitler thought carrying out a successful German counterattack in Hungary in 1945 would lead to rebellion in the Soviet Union.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> SPEER, *supra* note 63, at 292.

<sup>88</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 47.

<sup>89</sup> *Id.* at 48.

<sup>90</sup> *Id.* at 38-39.

<sup>91</sup> *See id.* at 48.

<sup>92</sup> *Id.* (citing PERCY SCHRAMM, *HITLER: THE MAN AND THE MILITARY LEADER* 156 (Donald Detwiler trans., Quadrangle Books, 1971)).

<sup>93</sup> *Id.*

<sup>94</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 48. Hitler excitedly drew a parallel with the death of Czarina Elizabeth which had saved Hitler's hero, Frederick the Great from a seemingly impossible military situation. *See* SPEER, *supra* note 63, at 419, 463. Hitler talked on for hours about this gift from "Providence." *Id.* Hitler often invoked Frederick and Providence when encouraging his entourage. *Id.*; *see also id.* at 453-54 (excerpts from correspondence from Speer to Hitler referencing the "Providence").

<sup>95</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 48.

<sup>96</sup> *Id.*

While other significant documentation of these changes exists, its presence here would add little value. The persons providing the evidence were all close associates of Hitler who had ample opportunity to observe him. Moreover, I know of no authoritative accounts that substantially contradict those cited.

### C. Memory Unaffected

In delimiting patterns of disorder, functions that remain normal are as important to note as those that become impaired. Hitler's most important normal finding is that he had no impairment of memory, especially memory of recent events.<sup>97</sup> Hitler was always noted for his prodigious memory, and he continued to astound observers until the end.<sup>98</sup> There are occasional comments in the voluminous literature describing Hitler that suggest loss of memory, but taken in context, such episodes can be explained as failure of concentration.<sup>99</sup> On the other hand, there is overwhelming testimony that his retention was unimpaired.<sup>100</sup> Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring described Hitler on March 8, 1945 as having an "astonishing grasp of detail."<sup>101</sup> Though transcripts of military conferences during the last period depict Hitler as often lost in detail, he was unquestionably in full command of those details.<sup>102</sup> Field-Marshal Keitel described Hitler as absolutely lucid up to April 29, 1945.<sup>103</sup> Hitler committed suicide the next day.<sup>104</sup>

### D. Neurological Manifestations

During the same period that he developed abnormalities of mental status, Hitler's neurological functions began to decline, pathologically.<sup>105</sup> The first sign, noted in mid

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<sup>97</sup> *Id.*

<sup>98</sup> *Id.*

<sup>99</sup> *Id.* at 48-49.

<sup>100</sup> *Id.* at 49.

<sup>101</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 49 (citing ALBERT KESSELRING, THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL KESSELRING 239 (William Kimber, 1953)).

<sup>102</sup> *Id.*

<sup>103</sup> *Id.*

<sup>104</sup> *Id.*

<sup>105</sup> *Id.*

1943, was a tremor involving Hitler's entire left arm.<sup>106</sup> The tremor worsened with emotional arousal; "a barometer of his excitement" said Speer, and as such, the tremor's intensity became a danger signal to those around Hitler.<sup>107</sup> The tremor, like the mental signs, waxed and waned over the next years but, overall, there was the same trend toward worsening.<sup>108</sup> During the early spring of 1943, the tremor spread to his left leg; at first occasionally, later almost constantly.<sup>109</sup> Hitler learned to control the leg tremor by wrapping his foot behind the leg of a chair and pressing forward.<sup>110</sup> Toward the end of his life the left arm tremor became coarser with larger excursions and the right hand and arm became involved.<sup>111</sup>

The next stages in Hitler's neurological decline were disturbances in locomotion.<sup>112</sup> About February of 1945, Hitler's gait became slowed and shuffled, and he seemed to drag his left leg.<sup>113</sup> Although the weakness of the left leg appears to have been apparent to observers for not more than a few weeks, the slowness persisted.<sup>114</sup> General Heinz Guderian described Hitler's gait as "*schleppend*," translated approximately as "slow-motion—as if carrying a heavy burden."<sup>115</sup> Never again was Hitler described as moving about normally.<sup>116</sup>

Morell, Hitler's doctor, said Hitler had a slight stroke early in 1945.<sup>117</sup> The focal weakness of the left leg and the subsequent slowing is consistent with that conclusion, as is a recording by Morell noting an "increased left patellar reflex."<sup>118</sup> This is the "knee jerk" reflex that often is increased on the side of the body affected by brain injury.<sup>119</sup> If Morell's finding is credited, it strongly supports his diagnosis of stroke. It is notable,

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<sup>106</sup> *Id.*

<sup>107</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 50 (citing Interview with Albert Speer (1975)).

<sup>108</sup> *Id.* at 50.

<sup>109</sup> *Id.* Dating the onset of the tremor has proven difficult as its development was doubtless insidious. I pursued the timing in interviews, especially with Linge and Speer. My best estimate is the left arm tremor was first definitively established in May 1943.

<sup>110</sup> *Id.* (citing Interview with Schenck (1975)).

<sup>111</sup> *See id.* at 52, 121.

<sup>112</sup> *Id.* at 50.

<sup>113</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 50.

<sup>114</sup> *Id.* at 51.

<sup>115</sup> *Id.*

<sup>116</sup> *Id.* at 51.

<sup>117</sup> *Id.* (citing OTTO *supra* note 71, at 213).

<sup>118</sup> *Id.*

<sup>119</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 51.

however, that Hitler had no mechanical problem with his speech during this period. Like the reflex abnormality and the left side weakness, this finding tends to locate the putative stroke to the right side of his brain.

### E. Summary of Medical Decline

Over a span of three-and-a-half years, Hitler experienced a medical decline such that at the end of the process, observers regarded him as near to death. The early features of the process included morbid anger, rigid thinking, and excessive attention to detail.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, Hitler was sometimes easily distracted, was often pathologically suspicious, and was generally overly optimistic, sometimes to the point of pathological elation.<sup>121</sup> Later, he developed a tremor involving first his left arm, then his left leg, and finally his right arm.<sup>122</sup> In early 1945, he developed a focal weakness of his left leg, and generalized weakness or possibly muscular rigidity.<sup>123</sup> The result was marked slowing and grossly affected locomotion.<sup>124</sup> All of these conditions improved from time to time, only to worsen again.<sup>125</sup> In the absence of an overt major disease such as cancer (for which there is no evidence, despite an autopsy), the time period during which these changes occurred was remarkably short.

Hitler's impairments precipitated a major turn in history.<sup>126</sup> His capacity for intellectual innovation, his flexible, highly effective responses to environmental challenges, and his extreme personal effectiveness were all gravely impaired by his physical and mental decline.<sup>127</sup>

## VII. DIAGNOSES

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<sup>120</sup> *Id.* at 54.

<sup>121</sup> *Id.*

<sup>122</sup> *Id.*

<sup>123</sup> *Id.*

<sup>124</sup> *Id.*

<sup>125</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 54.

<sup>126</sup> *Id.* at 54-55.

<sup>127</sup> *Id.* at 55.



Dr. Murray's diagnostic effort did not reach beyond psychoanalytic formulations. Although no absolute proofs will ever be forthcoming, in light of the evidence available today, it is reasonable to offer informed hypotheses. Moreover, the evidence enables estimating the effect of his medical conditions on his motivations and behaviors, and thereby, the likely consequences for history.

### A. Methamphetamine Toxicity

After assembling and evaluating the evidence, I suggest that toxicity due to intravenous and oral methamphetamine best account for his conditions.<sup>128</sup> Methamphetamine marketed as Pervitin® was widely available in wartime Germany.<sup>129</sup> Hitler experimented with drugs.<sup>130</sup> Starting in late 1941, he received intravenous injections from Dr. Morell nearly every morning on first arising.<sup>131</sup> His valet, Heinz Linge, who witnessed the injections, described the effect to me as freshening, invigorating, and energizing.<sup>132</sup> These effects were immediate, while Morell's needle was still in Hitler's arm.<sup>133</sup> Soviet intelligence sources also described Hitler's morning injections as "pep" injections.<sup>134</sup>

Starting in mid 1943, Hitler would summon Morell when bad news came to headquarters and receive another injection.<sup>135</sup> Again, observers described an "immediate" alerting, energizing effect followed by increased volume and rate of speech.<sup>136</sup> Headquarters personnel believed that other injections and tablets that Morell administered to Hitler contained stimulant drugs.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> *Id.* at 82, 87 (explaining though methamphetamine was not on Morell's list of drugs, it was a drug Hitler took which had deadly effects).

<sup>129</sup> *Id.* at 89.

<sup>130</sup> *See, e.g., id.* at 75-80 (describing several drugs Hitler took).

<sup>131</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 82-83 (citing Heinz Linge's appointment book from 1943-45; Interview with Linge (1975 & 1977)).

<sup>132</sup> *Id.* at 83.

<sup>133</sup> *Id.*

<sup>134</sup> *Id.* (citing LEV BEZYMENSKI, THE DEATH OF ADOLF HITLER: UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS FROM SOVIET ARCHIVES 11 (Michael Joseph, 1968)).

<sup>135</sup> *Id.*

<sup>136</sup> *Id.*

<sup>137</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 83-85.

The effect of the drugs, especially the morning injections Linge described, is compatible with methamphetamine and with no other drug available at the time.<sup>138</sup> Methamphetamine can readily account for all of Hitler's mental status changes—his in fact are classic—and convincing alternative explanations have not been advanced. Finally, methamphetamine can account for major features of Hitler's neurological decline and another of his afflictions, coronary artery disease.

The heart disease was clinically silent. The fact that there was actual heart damage is known only through electrocardiograms that Morell took and sent off for expert interpretation.<sup>139</sup> Methamphetamine, especially on intravenous injection, produces intense constriction of arteries causing abrupt increases in blood pressure and interruptions of blood supply. Two of the organs frequently affected are the heart and brain. Hitler's end stage physical condition is entirely compatible with this mechanism.

## B. Parkinson's Disease

Hitler had tremors which in their appearance and in their progression from limb to limb are characteristic of Parkinson's disease.<sup>140</sup> However, there remains one factor that is difficult for proponents of that diagnosis to explain. Hitler's tremors disappeared for a significant period, at least two weeks, probably longer, after the assassination attempt against him on July 20, 1944.<sup>141</sup> This finding is most difficult to reconcile with Parkinson's disease but does not absolutely exclude it. In practice, perfect textbook examples are rare; often there are anomalies in the presentation of diseases that clinicians must try to reasonably explain or discount. Parkinson's disease remains, at least, possible. However, Parkinson's disease cannot explain the major features of Hitler's pathological mental state and indeed, memory impairment, a regular feature of

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<sup>138</sup> *Id.* at 83-84. Moreover, cocaine is a possible exception but the preferred route of administration by sniffing and intravenous preparations were probably not available. *Id.* at 84. Both drugs would produce similar immediate and long term results.

<sup>139</sup> *Id.* at 56-57 (citing Interviews with and Letters from Rolf Makkus (1975 & 1976)).

<sup>140</sup> *Id.* at 122.

<sup>141</sup> *Id.* at 53. Dr. Geising who attended Hitler at the time said "weeks." Morell said two months. Other accounts say the tremor disappeared until the autumn. In my interview, Linge was also indefinite, but when pushed, said Hitler was much better through August but maybe the arm tremor had started again "before that." Mid August was his best, though uncertain, estimate. Interview with Heinz Linge (1975 & 1977).

Parkinson's disease, was absent in Hitler.<sup>142</sup> A symptomatic Parkinsonian syndrome secondary to brain damage or some action of the myriad drugs Hitler was taking provides a plausible explanation of Hitler's Parkinsonian movement disorder. Alternatively, he may have had Parkinson's disease in addition to methamphetamine toxicity.

### VIII. EFFECTS OF DRUG TOXICITY

If the above analysis is provisionally accepted, then methamphetamine toxicity can throw light on significant events occurring during and after the winter of 1941-42. While Hitler may well have used the drug before that, he did not exhibit major deficits in mental status and he stayed faithful to goals he had set forth in *Mein Kampf*, years before drugs could have affected his motivations.<sup>143</sup> Primarily, Hitler was motivated to nullify the Treaty of Versailles and obtain lebensraum for Germany at the expense of the Soviet Union.<sup>144</sup>

#### A. War with the United States

During the winter battles of 1941, Hitler first showed definite signs consistent with drug toxicity.<sup>145</sup> While there were many ramifications of Hitler's developing impairment apparent during that winter, I shall focus on one critically important decision that has never been satisfactorily explained, his declaration of war against the United States. This immediately followed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th.<sup>146</sup>

Japan's action was a major surprise to the German government and how Germany should best respond was not clear.<sup>147</sup> Japan and Germany (with Italy) were signers of the "Tripartite Pact."<sup>148</sup> This treaty promised Germany would come to the aid

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<sup>142</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 48.

<sup>143</sup> *Id.* at 130.

<sup>144</sup> *Id.*

<sup>145</sup> *Id.* at 131.

<sup>146</sup> *Id.* at 133.

<sup>147</sup> ALLAN BULLOCK, *HITLER: A STUDY OF TYRANNY* 661 (Harper & Row Pub. Rev. ed. 1962).

<sup>148</sup> See JOHN TOLAND, *ADOLF HITLER* 631, 634 (Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1976).

of Japan if Japan was attacked, but no action was specified if Japan did the attacking.<sup>149</sup> In early December, before the Pearl Harbor attack but after the Japanese fleet had been dispatched, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin was assured that Japan would “receive aid” if she went to war with the United States.<sup>150</sup> However, the German foreign ministry opined that no agreement with Japan compelled war by Germany if Japan initiated war with the United States.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, Germany’s policy had been to engage Japan in an alliance against the Soviet Union.<sup>152</sup> Japan had a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union and adamantly rejected that course.<sup>153</sup> Thus, Germany could not gain its primary objective by supporting Japan’s war.<sup>154</sup>

Hitler had repeatedly asserted that a major pillar of his foreign policy was to avoid a declared war with the United States.<sup>155</sup> A limited de facto naval war was underway in the Atlantic Ocean, but Hitler, though incensed by President Roosevelt’s open support of Great Britain, strove to contain it.<sup>156</sup> However, in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Hitler abruptly changed.<sup>157</sup> He was at the time heavily involved with Soviet attacks against German armies besieged before Moscow.<sup>158</sup> The Soviet counteroffensive, beginning on December 6, 1941, threatened to sweep away and destroy the German army.<sup>159</sup> The situation was critical, requiring Hitler’s full attention as he forced his solution on the German commanders.<sup>160</sup> Japanese relations must have been a major distraction.

On December 11th in a major speech, Hitler declared war against America.<sup>161</sup> His decision had elements of impulsiveness, impatience, and euphoric grandiosity

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<sup>149</sup> *Id.* at 634.

<sup>150</sup> *Id.* at 693-94.

<sup>151</sup> *Id.* at 695.

<sup>152</sup> WARLIMONT, *supra* note 64, at 144-45.

<sup>153</sup> *Id.*

<sup>154</sup> See BULLOCK, *supra* note 147, at 661. As alluded to above, Germany’s primary objective was to engage Japan in a war against the Soviet Union, and if unsuccessful, to persuade Japan to join Germany in its war with England. Japan’s non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union clearly hindered Hitler’s plan.

<sup>155</sup> TOLAND, *supra* note 148, at 690.

<sup>156</sup> *Id.*

<sup>157</sup> See BULLOCK, *supra* note 147, at 661-62.

<sup>158</sup> *Id.* at 660-61.

<sup>159</sup> *Id.* at 661.

<sup>160</sup> *Id.* at 664.

<sup>161</sup> TOLAND, *supra* note 148, at 696.

entirely consistent with methamphetamine toxicity.<sup>162</sup> This hypothesis cannot be proven but it is reasonable and consistent with the evidence.

The German foreign office regarded Hitler's declaration of war as a colossal mistake.<sup>163</sup> Indeed, it was. President Roosevelt would have had great difficulty persuading the American public to support a German war.<sup>164</sup> Isolationism, distrust of Great Britain, and impatience with European affairs were dominating factors in large segments of the population.<sup>165</sup> In contrast, revenge for Pearl Harbor was enthusiastically supported by Americans of all backgrounds and persuasions.<sup>166</sup> Absent Hitler's action, America's war might well have been limited to the Pacific.<sup>167</sup>

## B. The Holocaust

Another decision, that dates from the same period, implementing the *end lösung* (final solution), was unlikely to have been affected by drug toxicity. That decision had far-reaching logistical consequences requiring long range planning and perspective. In sharp contrast, decisions influenced by methamphetamine toxicity are characteristically driven by impulsive responses to contemporary stimuli, often mediated by drug-induced euphoria or paranoia, or both.<sup>168</sup> Also, because the decision to carry out mass murder had to be implemented over time, Hitler, who at worst was not always in a toxic state, had opportunity to rescind his decision if he had chosen to do so.<sup>169</sup> This fundamentally contrasts with an order given in a military conference to be implemented in the immediate future or the utterance of a line in a speech that could not be taken back.

Other manifestations of Hitler's chronic toxicity that likely influenced events were his mental rigidity and euphoria.<sup>170</sup> His flexibility and patience were, in pre-war years, major assets. He often repeated a slogan "*so oder so*" ("one way or the other") to

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<sup>162</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 133.

<sup>163</sup> TOLAND, *supra* note 148, at 695.

<sup>164</sup> *Id.* at 695-96.

<sup>165</sup> *Id.* at 692.

<sup>166</sup> *Id.* at 695-96.

<sup>167</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 133.

<sup>168</sup> *Id.* at 134.

<sup>169</sup> *Id.*

<sup>170</sup> *See generally id.* at 46, 135 (describing Hitler's mood swings).

emphasize his willingness to adapt, be patient, and to attain his goals using whatever methods would best serve the purpose.<sup>171</sup> That adaptability was progressively impaired.<sup>172</sup> In the later war years, original thought was replaced by slogans: “no retreat;” “stronger will triumphant over stronger battalions;” “victory or death.”<sup>173</sup> Mental rigidity was also evident in his direction of wartime research. He was well aware that weapons development accelerated during war.<sup>174</sup> But whereas he had previously developed or administratively supported original, often highly creative ideas,<sup>175</sup> he became fixated on one weapon system, long range rockets.<sup>176</sup> He persisted in this long after it became apparent that rockets could not become a decisive weapon system.<sup>177</sup> Resources were limited, and choices had to be made. In practice, Hitler’s mental rigidity excluded or significantly delayed developments such as jet aircraft, sound-seeking torpedoes, heat-seeking ground to air rockets, snorkel equipped submarines, radar, and even atomic energy.<sup>178</sup>

### C. Stalingrad

His chronic euphoria caused catastrophic misjudgments. This is especially well illustrated by the loss of Germany’s Stalingrad army. Hitler persisted in underestimating Soviet military capabilities.<sup>179</sup> He minimized or ignored evidence presented to him, calling cautionary intelligence estimates “rubbish.”<sup>180</sup> The Stalingrad offensive was paired with an offensive aimed toward the Caucasus mountain area.<sup>181</sup> His generals strenuously argued that this dual effort was unsustainable and wanted to move significant

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<sup>171</sup> See generally *id.* at 72 (discussing Hitler’s flexibility regarding strategies and tactics).

<sup>172</sup> *Id.* at 134-35.

<sup>173</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 135.

<sup>174</sup> *Id.* at 136.

<sup>175</sup> For example, the Autobahns, the Volkswagen automobile, the Stuka airplane and its operation in conjunction with tanks in blitzkrieg offenses, and the planning for the attacks on Norway and France. *Id.* at 70-71.

<sup>176</sup> *Id.* at 136.

<sup>177</sup> *Id.*

<sup>178</sup> *Id.*

<sup>179</sup> See WARLIMONT, *supra* note 64, at 249 (discussing a written description by one of Hitler’s generals regarding Hitler’s leadership abilities at that time).

<sup>180</sup> *Id.* at 498.

<sup>181</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 38.

reinforcements from the Caucasus army to the Stalingrad attack.<sup>182</sup> Hitler would have none of it.<sup>183</sup> He insisted that the army could sustain both offenses, not with reasoned argument, but with slogans and dictate.<sup>184</sup> Later, when the Stalingrad army was in grave jeopardy and his generals wanted to extract it, Hitler insisted that it remain where it was and invoked any flimsy argument at hand that supported that decision.<sup>185</sup> Thus Herman Göring, commander of the Luftwaffe, offered to supply the army by air.<sup>186</sup> Göring's estimate of his airfreight capacity relative to the army's needs was immediately challenged by irrefutable arithmetic.<sup>187</sup> But Hitler seized on Göring's projections; the airlift failed and the army was lost.<sup>188</sup> Similar blundering contributed to the nearly simultaneous German failures in North Africa and from there on through the end of the war.<sup>189</sup>

## IX. CONCLUSION

There is a final irony in the story of Hitler's decline, a happy one for the allied cause. Pre-1941, mental faculties intact, Hitler's judgments were most often unerringly correct, and those who contested them were proved wrong.<sup>190</sup> After that date, with Hitler's faculties impaired, his critics were more often correct, and Hitler's judgments proved disastrous to the German cause. Neither the war nor efforts to end it were pursued effectively. However, his critics had been so thoroughly disarmed by his earlier triumphs that they had come to doubt their own judgment.<sup>191</sup> There are accounts of senior commanders who attempted to confront Hitler but came away doubting themselves and thinking that Hitler was correct again.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> *Id.* at 134-35; *see also* WARLIMONT, *supra* note 64, at 286.

<sup>183</sup> WARLIMONT, *supra* note 64, at 286.

<sup>184</sup> *Id.*

<sup>185</sup> HESTON & HESTON, *supra* note 8, at 134-35.

<sup>186</sup> *Id.* at 135.

<sup>187</sup> *Id.*

<sup>188</sup> *Id.*

<sup>189</sup> *Id.*

<sup>190</sup> *See, e.g.*, MASER *supra* note 13, at 270.

<sup>191</sup> *See id.* at 274 (describing Eberhard von Breitenbuch's attempt to reason with Hitler).

<sup>192</sup> *Id.*

For the same reason, as Dr. Murray predicted, it was extremely difficult for such men to contemplate removing Hitler from power, much less take effective action toward that end.<sup>193</sup> Even the assassination attempt of July 1944 was bungled by irresolution in the attempt and so, plots failed and Dr. Murray was proved correct when he predicted Hitler would stay in power until the allied military forced him out. After considering several possible endings of Hitler's reign, Dr. Murray concluded Hitler was most likely to die by his own hand in the most dramatic setting he could command.<sup>194</sup> "There is a powerful compulsion in him to sacrifice himself and all of Germany to the revengeful annihilation of Western culture, to die, dragging all of Europe with him into the abyss."<sup>195</sup> So very prophetic.

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<sup>193</sup> See MURRAY, *supra* note 1, at 221-22.

<sup>194</sup> *Id.* at 225.

<sup>195</sup> *Id.* at 16.